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bstract
We use an updated form of an old database to examine aid predictability, i.e. the relationship between commitments and disbursements. In
ontrast to the existing literature, the regression results suggest that on average almost all commitments tend to be met within two years, with the
verwhelming majority met immediately. But the situation is different with respect to individual sectors. Some such as infrastructure have very
ong lags. For some sectors too it seems likely that commitments will never be fully met. Debt aid, however, tends to be disbursed in full almost
mmediately. There are also substantial differences between countries.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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.  Introduction
In recent years, although not entirely a smooth progression,
he impact of aid has tended to be viewed more favourably in
he literature than was previously the case. One negative aspect,
owever, has been aid variability or randomness, and indeed
 key pledge from the Paris declaration of 2005, signed by
eveloped and donor countries as well as multilateral donor
gencies, was to make aid more predictable. This commitment
as later reinforced in 2008 by the Accra Agenda for Action and
he Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
f 2011. Celasun and Walliser (2008) argue that unexpected
id shortfalls can force governments to disproportionately cut
nvestment, including in human capital, while aid windfalls can
isproportionately boost government consumption. The issue is
elatively new to the literature. Most of the work has focused
n aid volatility, as measured by the deviation, or the deviation∗ Tel.: +44 1225 385287.
E-mail address: j.r.hudson@bath.ac.uk
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.quared, of aid from a trend. The key early work was that of Bulir
nd Hamann (2003, 2008). Others have since built on this (for
xample, Hudson and Mosley, 2008a). In this paper we focus
ot on aid volatility as traditionally defined, but predictability.
his is the difference between aid commitments, or promises,
nd actual aid disbursements. There has been some work on
his, and the general consensus is that in most years, disbursed
id volumes differ ‘widely’ from commitments, and that this is
orse in the poorest and most aid dependent countries (Celasun
nd Walliser, 2008).
In 2005 the OECD-Development Assistance Committee
DAC) developed Progress Indicator 7 to assess whether the
arget of making aid more predictable is being achieved. The
ata suggests that there is a substantial discrepancy between the
ecords of the donor and recipient countries (OECD, 2011). In
010, 98% of the aid scheduled for disbursement at the beginning
f 2010 was disbursed according to donor records.1 However,
his does not mean that disbursements are consistent with com-
itments at the point of time they were originally made. This
verall level of consistency also hides considerable variations.
hus, only 60% of aid recipient countries were within 15% of
lanned disbursements and 27% were within 5%.The database we use is the OECD’s Creditor Reporting Sys-
em (CRS) on the DAC website. This gives detailed information
n aid disbursements, and, over a longer time, commitments,
1 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/48726803.pdf
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y 50 different sectors and sub-sectors. The data on disburse-
ents is only available in a reliable form since 2002, but in
he context of panel data analysis this is now sufficient to allow
eaningful analysis. We are the first to analyse this more reliable
ata and to analyse not just the totality of aid, but also different
id sectors such as health, education, programme assistance and
nfrastructure. Our analysis shows that the relationship between
ommitments and disbursements is more complex than previ-
usly thought. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section
e will review the literature, before proceeding to a discussion of
ethodological issues. We then discuss the data and present the
esults of a regression analysis. Finally we conclude the paper.
.  Literature  review
As we have said, much of the literature has tended to focus
n aid volatility, but many of the conclusions tend to carry
ver to predictability. Rodrik (1990) argues that the volatility
f revenue inflows, a high proportion of which are aid in the
ase of the poorest countries, may result in volatility of expen-
iture and instability of policy. Mosley and Suleiman (2007)
how that the ability of the recipient country’s public sector to
mplement coherent investment programmes and fiscal policies
s reduced by aid volatility. Lensink and Morrissey (2000), con-
lude that volatility damages the macro-economic effectiveness
f aid. However, the key initial work in this area was by Bulir and
amann (2003, 2008). They argue that the volatility of aid is; (i)
reater than that of government revenue, (ii) increasing over time
nd (iii) pro-cyclical (i.e. aid flows are inversely correlated with
he level of government expenditures in any particular year).
heir measure of aid volatility was based on aid de-trended by
 Hodrick–Prescott filter.
This defines volatility as deviations from a trend. However,
t is possible to conceive of another form of volatility and
hat is the gap between aid disbursements and commitments.
his is what Celasun and Walliser (2008) term predictability.
hey conclude that, in most years, disbursed aid volumes differ
widely’ from commitments, and that this is worse in the poo-
est and most aid dependent countries. Moreover, they find little
elationship between volatility and predictability. They argue
hat there are good and bad reasons for donor unpredictability.
elays in project disbursements may result from recipients not
eeting specific procedural requirements for safeguarding aid
esources. On the other hand, less justifiable reasons include
xcessive administration, delays in aid bureaucracies, cumber-
ome approval and disbursement processes, and intra-year aid
eallocations that prevent the timely disbursement of announced
id. Donors may also add to, or subtract from, their originally
lanned aid to a recipient country during the year, in response
o developments in, or based on the aid needs of, other recipient
ountries. Eifert and Gelb (2008) note that a 2005 assessment
f donors’ views by the SPA Budget Support Working Group
ndicated that 40% of non-disbursements were considered to be
ue to a failure to meet policy conditionality, 25% to recipient
overnments’ delays in meeting administrative conditions, 29%
o administrative problems on the donor’s side, 4% to political
roblems on the donor’s side and 2% to other factors. st Finance 3 (2013) 109–120
Contrary to common belief, although as suggested by the
ECD’s indicator 7 data discussed earlier, Celasun and Wal-
iser find that a lack of predictability typically involves managing
oth aid shortfalls and windfalls. This conclusion has echoes of
udson and Mosley (2008a, 2008b) who distinguish between
ositive and negative volatility. Celasun and Walliser conclude
hat shortfalls hamper aid management even in countries with
 stable implementation of macroeconomic policies. Regres-
ion analysis of the sources of low predictability picks up two
ndicators that could be seen as justifying unexpected revi-
ions in aid disbursements. Nonetheless, a large unexplained
esidual remains. Using detailed data from IMF programmes,
hey demonstrate that there are significant costs of low pre-
ictability of budget aid in relatively well performing recipient
ountries. Deviations of disbursed from expected budget aid of
ore than 1% of GDP on average are absorbed asymmetrically:
id shortfalls lead to debt accumulation and cuts in investment
pending, whereas aid windfalls help reduce debt and also lead
o additional government consumption. Unpredictability thus
hifts government spending from investment to consumption
ctivities.
Much of the literature has focused on delayed disbursements
ather than commitments which are never fully implemented.
iarra (2011) argues that such delays arise from both donors and
ecipients. In many recipient countries, the public administration
s not able to follow accurately all the procedures requested by
onors and this situation leads to disbursement delays. Other
ecipient specific factors limiting recipient capacity include the
vailability of skilled workers. Leurs (2005) cites bureaucratic
roblems with the donors. With infrastructure projects this may
ean initial feasibility and design studies have to be redone.
he Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
as responded to this by emphasising the need to delegate more
uthority to field staff. Delays can also occur in response to
olitical uncertainties. Leurs cites the example of the run-up to
n election when a change of government is expected. There are
wo possible reasons for delay, firstly a concern that funds will be
iverted to campaigning, and secondly to enable the donor to put
ressure on a new government. The example of Bolivia in 2002
s cited when disbursements fell by 80% from their expected
evel.
.  The  donor’s  allocation  problem
In this section we focus on aid unpredictability caused not by
dministrative problems or aid recipient countries failing to fulfil
ommitments, but in response to the need to manage a limited
id budget with multiple needs. For a given recipient country,
e can assume donors tend to maximise some form of welfare
unction subject to a fixed budget constraint.
ax W  =
∑
[ai(ACit −  ADit)2
+  βi(ACit −  ADit +  γi(ACit−1 −  ADit−1))2] (1)t
∑
ADit =  At (2)
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The welfare function in (1) is a quadratic which relates to
oth current deviations of disbursements (ADi) from commit-
ents (ACi) in the ith sector, and the sum of such deviations
n the current and previous year. ACit represents aid commit-
ed to be disbursed in period t. It is not therefore the same as
jt in the empirical work which follows, which relates to com-
itments made in period t  for disbursement either in period t
r later to country j. Donors are therefore trying to compensate
or shortfalls and excesses from the previous period. In doing
his it is possible that some of the harm, both on the donor’s
eputation and the recipient, caused by previous differences can
e mitigated, particularly if the recipient is aware that this will
appen. Hence we are assuming that there is an incentive for
he donor to correct for unpredictability in the previous period.
i is the weight given to achieving the target in sector i  in the
urrent period, t. βi is the weight given to smoothing out the
ap between committed and disbursed aid in the two periods
ombined. γ i represents the extent to which this is feasible. It is
mplicit that αi is a function of γ i. Solving this gives:
D∗it =
ACit −  λ
αi +  βi +
[
βiγi
αi +  βi
]
(ACit−1 −  ADit−1) (3)
Eq. (3) relates optimal disbursed aid (ADit*) to promised
r committed aid (ACit). Deviations from commitments
ADit* −  ACit) are related to the Lagrangean multiplier (λ) and
he desire (βi), and feasibility (γ i), to correct for unpredictabil-
ty in the previous period. If At, the aid budget, is sufficient to
eet in full the donor’s desired disbursements, then λ = 0, and
Dit* will be a weighted average of the desire to make good the
revious aid gap between disbursements and commitments and
 desire not to add to this period’s volatility.
Hence donors will be aware that unpredictability is poten-
ially damaging to both the recipient country and its own
redibility as a donor. But nonetheless, aid may still be unpre-
ictable for a number of reasons quite apart from administrative
elays and perceived problems with the recipient country, such
s corruption. An emergency elsewhere may lead to a tighten-
ng of budgets to other countries, leading to an increase in λ
n (3). Similarly there may be a need to switch aid between
ectors within countries, quite independently of what is hap-
ening elsewhere. This can occur in response to an emergency
n the country or unforeseen developments possibly associated
ith existing aid spending. However, as already indicated, hav-
ng diverted aid away from sector i in period t, the donor may
espond by increasing it above trend in the following period and
ice versa in a sector which saw an aid surge. In this way aid
hocks can have ripple effects.
.  Methodology
Comparing disbursements and commitments is made com-
licated by the fact that commitments may not be planned to
e disbursed for several years. Hence the disbursement of aid
ommitted in t is likely to be less than that commitment and,
ithout further commitments, disbursements will exceed com-
itments for the period of the schedule. Further commitments,
n subsequent years, will complicate this situation further. Hence
a
a
r
lt Finance 3 (2013) 109–120 111
omparisons between disbursements and commitments in a sin-
le year are likely to be misleading. We assume that committed
id relating to sector i follows a typical disbursement pattern,
ith δ0, being the proportion disbursed in the same year, δ1 the
ollowing year and so on. In this case, if commitments are fully
et over K  + 1 years, disbursed aid in period t will equal
jt =  δ0Cjt +  δ1Cjt−1 +  δ2Cjt−2 +  δ3Cjt−3 +  · ·  · +  δkCjt−K
(4)
here Djt denotes disbursements for country j in period t and
Cjt−g) are aid commitments made in t −  g  for disbursement
n t. We have some information on (4). Firstly ∑Kk=1δk =  1.
econdly we anticipate that in general δk ≥  δk+1, although there
ay be organisational lags which result in δ0 < δ1. Despite this
e would expect δk to decline through the commitment period
nd in general to be highest in the early years of that period.
hirdly, we expect that δk ≥  0 ∀  k, i.e. the donor will not plan to
ive aid to the recipient and then recover some of that aid. Finally,
e anticipate the lag structure will be longer for infrastructure
id, than say for government aid.
In reality the disbursements for individual countries will not
dhere exactly to the lag structure indicated in (4). We also have
nite observations and hence have to terminate the lag structure
t some point. Thus, the regression equation we will estimate is:
jt =  β0 +  d0Cjt +  d1Cjt−1 +  d2Cjt−2 +  d3Cjt−3
+  ·  · ·  +  dmCjt−M +  εjt (5)
here di is the actual proportion of aid which is on average
isbursed i years after the commitment is made. If commit-
ents are fully realised di = δi. The constant term is comprised
f two parts. Firstly it equals E(∑Kk=M+1dkCjt−k). Secondly it
ill capture aid which is given independently of commitments.
ecause of the first possibility it is important to try to ensure that
(∑Kk=M+1dkCjt−k) is as small as possible, leaving the constant
erm reflecting just disbursed aid which is independent of com-
itments. We will use a lag depth, M, of four years. This results
n five years of current and lagged aid commitments on the right
and side of (5). In the event that the Hausman test indicates the
se of fixed effects, we will effectively be estimating a separate
onstant tern for each country. Assuming no aid is disbursed
ndependently of commitments, the error term results from (i)
he disbursement pattern for the country being different to the
eneral pattern indicated in (5) and (ii) shortfalls or excesses
n any one year from the country’s usual disbursement pattern.
pecifically, if K  ≤  M:
jt =
∑M
k=1[(djk −  dk)Cjt−k +  (djkt −  djk)Cjt−k] +  bij (6)
here djk is the disbursement parameter for country j and djkt
s the actual proportion disbursed in any one particular year. bjt
epresents aid disbursed or ‘taken back’ which is not linked to
id commitments which were made for fulfilment in period t,
nd which are different to β0. If positive, for example, it may be
eacting to disbursement shortfalls in previous periods. Regard-
ess of whether the error arises from the first or the second term
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infrastructure, debt and PA sectors. But aid to industry is still
not that great.12 J. Hudson / Review of Develo
n the summation or bij, if the error is positive in one period,
eflecting an excess of disbursements, it will tend to be negative
n other periods in order to compensate, and vice versa. Thus
here will tend to be a pattern to the residuals within a country.
For the same reason that we expect δk ≥  0, we anticipate that
n general dk ≥  0. It is however possible that some dk < 0. If this
s the case, it will signal that commitments previously met may
ave been ‘taken back’ in a later period. This does not mean that
he aid money is returned as such. If, e.g. d4 < 0 the interpretation
ould be that disbursements in period t from commitments made
n periods t to t  −  3 will be less than expected. As is always the
ase with regression analysis, the results will only capture aver-
ge behaviour and average lags. For reasons already discussed
e would expect for most sectors that the largest coefficients
ill be d0 and d1. We would also anticipate some sectors such as
nfrastructure to have longer lags than others. If there are large
ariations between countries around the lag structure indicated
n Eq. (5), then the within R2s will be low. In the same way
s with the consumption function, for example, where we can
dd the coefficients on current and lagged one-year disposable
ncome to obtain a marginal propensity to consume, so d0 + d1
ill give an indication of the proportion of commitments typ-
cally fulfilled within two years. More generally
∑J
j=0dj will
epresent the proportion of commitments met after J  + 1 years.
.  The  data
The DAC has been tracking aggregate information about aid
ince 1960. The CRS was established in 1973 to collect more
etailed information about individual aid loans, and later grants,
o complement the recording of aggregate flows. There are two
ets of data on aid, relating to commitments and disbursements.
ommitments represent “a firm obligation, expressed in writing
nd backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official
onor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a
ultilateral organisation”. On the DAC website it further clari-
es that “bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount
f expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the
ompletion of disbursements”. Disbursements are the “release
f funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient;
y extension, the amount thus spent”. They record the actual
nternational transfer of financial resources, or of goods or ser-
ices valued at the cost to the donor, and as already emphasised
ommitments made in period t are not necessarily implemented
n that year. The term “aid sector” signifies the sector of the
ecipient’s economy that the aid activity is designed to assist,
.g. health, infrastructure and agriculture. For activities cutting
cross several sectors, either a multi-sector sector code or the
ode corresponding to the largest component of the activity is
sed. The CRS comments that not all aid is allocable to sectors
nd this is included as ‘non-sector allocable aid’. Examples of
ectors relate to debt and emergency assistance. All the data are
erived from the section of the database termed ‘sector’ which
s why we use this generic term in this paper.
The CRS has been used in many of the recent analyses on aid
olatility and aid impacts (e.g. Clemens et al., 2012; Fielding and
avrotas, 2008; Neanidis and Varvarigos, 2009). But there are nt Finance 3 (2013) 109–120
oubts about its suitability in early years. The completeness of
RS commitments for DAC members has improved from 70%
n 1995 to over 90% in 2000 and reached nearly 100% starting
rom 2003 flows. With respect to CRS disbursements, before
002 the annual coverage is below 60%, while it is around and
ver 90% since 2002 and reached nearly 100% starting with
007 flows.2 Thus the OECD warns against using the earlier
ata for sectors of analysis, and on the main database this data is
nly available since 1995 for commitments and since 2002 for
isbursements. As a consequence 2002 represents the start date
or the sample period we use in this paper.
Nonetheless there are still problems of aid which is not allo-
atable to sectors for both disbursements and commitments. We
herefore follow the procedure of excluding data where for com-
itments and lagged commitments in any year, unallocatable aid
s 5% or more of the total. Similarly we exclude disbursements
here unallocatable aid is 5% or more. Thus in our sample
verage unallocatable aid for disbursements is just 1.2% and
or current and lagged commitments averages just 0.8%. How-
ver, this leads to potential problems of sample selection bias
nd hence we use Heckman’s methodology to check for this. In
ddition as a further check we also repeat the regressions where
e include all observations from 2006 onwards. This helps with
he problem, as unallocatable aid declines in all years and from
006 onwards is relatively a minor problem.
We analyse all the main sectors, or their constituent parts,
ut not all of the sub-sectors. Instead we focus on the social
nfrastructure and production sub-sectors. Specific details on
he data can be found in Appendix. In order to be able to make
alid comparisons between countries we need to normalise aid
n some manner. In this paper we choose to do this by taking aid
s a proportion of recipient country GDP. The data is available
or different donors as well as different types of aid. We focus
n ODA for all donors.
Table 1 shows information on both disbursements and
ommitments for those observations where coverage for both
isbursements and commitments is greater than 95%. Aver-
ge total committed aid is 10.49% of GDP for the sample of
ountries, which is more than twice the median, indicating the
nfluence of some high aid dependent countries. The social
nfrastructure sector, including education, health and govern-
ent, is a major component of this, as are the infrastructure
nd programme assistance (PA) sectors. Aid to industry how-
ver is not that important. In general the ratio of the mean to
he median is much higher for the sectors than for total aid,
ndicating that donors tend to focus on specific sectors within
ountries. Disbursements tend to be on a par with, although gen-
rally less than, commitments. Debt aid is an exception to this.
ommitments and disbursements tend to be substantially higher
or Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), particularly for the other social2 Although the website gives links to data on coverage ratios, in practice it is
ot possible to access the data for sectors and countries.
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Table 1
Summary data on aid disbursements and commitments (% of GDP): 2002–2010.
Full sample Sub-Saharan Africa
Commitments Disbursements Commitments Disbursements
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Total 10.49 5.03 10.34 4.77 14.50 11.12 15.41 10.76
Education 0.94 0.31 0.86 0.34 1.04 0.70 0.98 0.81
Health 0.66 0.18 0.63 0.17 0.94 0.57 0.82 0.64
Other social infra. 1.10 0.47 0.87 0.43 1.80 1.26 1.47 1.20
Humanitarian 0.72 0.047 0.62 0.05 1.32 0.18 1.23 0.17
Industry 0.12 0.012 0.10 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.044
Non-industrial P. 0.56 0.22 0.49 0.21 0.79 0.43 0.62 0.42
Infrastructure 1.37 0.49 1.01 0.42 1.76 0.85 1.16 0.89
Debt 0.99 0.002 2.18 0.007 2.19 0.18 4.96 0.32
Government 1.62 0.40 1.40 0.40 1.73 0.89 1.53 0.81
PA 1.22 0.12 1.15 0.14 1.87 0.83 1.72 0.89
M 0.
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pulti-sectors 1.05 0.30 0.88 
otes: As a % of GDP. For definitions see table in the appendix. PA denotes pro
.  Regression  results
In Table 2 we show the regressions of disbursements on
urrent and lagged commitments3 using fixed effects. Fixed
ffects allows each country to have its own constant term. The
egressions correct the standard errors to allow for clustered
ntra-country correlation. The first column suggests that overall
ommitments are almost fully met after two years, i.e. commit-
ents made in period t have been almost fully met by the end of
 + 1. Hence we do not find, as does previous literature, that, at
east in the period 2002–2010, disbursements in the aggregate
ear little relation to commitments.
However, the situation for individual aid sectors is somewhat
ifferent. Column 2 shows that after 2 years only 22% of educa-
ion commitments have been met, and by 4 years this is only up
o about 33%.4 Even after 5 years, substantially less than 40%
f commitments have been disbursed. The time lags involved
ith health are shorter, with most commitments being met after
 years. But the pattern for other social infrastructure is different
gain. After two years, 22% of commitments have been met and
fter five years just 51%. For humanitarian aid, almost 87% is
isbursed within two years and then nothing more. This pattern
f delayed, and probably unrealised, commitments is repeated
n other sectors. For example after 5 years, less than 70% of
ommitments to industry have been fulfilled. It seems likely
hat in the case of many of these sectors such commitments will
ot be met, i.e. planned for and expected aid flows have not
aterialised after 5 years and probably will not materialise. The
3 In this case we normalise aid by dividing both current and lagged aid com-
itments and disbursements by GDPt (all at constant US$ prices). This ensures
hat if, e.g. all aid committed in t − 2 was distributed in t, the coefficient on two
ear lagged commitments would equal 1. If we divided these lagged commit-
ents by GDP in period t − 2, and GDP had changed, this would not be the
ase.
4 In doing these summations we count both significant and insignificant vari-
bles. Readers may prefer to do their own summations based on only significant
ariables, although in this case it would be better to rerun the regressions with
nsignificant variables excluded.
a
t
t
t
h
s
e
a
d26 0.72 0.49 0.56 0.44
me assistance, non-industrial P. is short for non-industrial production.
lowest rates of fulfilment, in that most of the commitment lags
re significant and that there are still substantial commitments
eing met after 5 years, are in the other social infrastructure
nd infrastructure sectors. The significance of the latter is not
urprising perhaps, given the long time lags which are probably
nvolved with infrastructure investment. The most rapid, if in
ome cases only partial, implementation of commitments relate
o debt, health and humanitarian aid. Debt aid commitments
ppear to be fulfilled, indeed over-fulfilled, almost immediately.
The constant terms are of interest.5 Firstly, as indicated
arlier, in part it is composed of disbursements from aid commit-
ents made in t −  5 or earlier. Hence if significant, it indicates
hat such long lags are also in evidence and further disbursements
rom previous commitments still likely. Secondly, if a constant
s significant and all the coefficients on current and lagged com-
itments are insignificant, it would suggest that disbursements
re randomly distributed around a specific amount in a way not
ystematically linked to commitments. If the variability around
he constant term was then low it would indicate that the sector
s to an extent on auto-pilot, with a steady flow of disbursements
ndependent of current and past commitments. This perspective
lso has some validity when some γ i, for low values of i,6 are
ignificantly positive, but their sum is substantially less than
ne and the constant term is significantly positive. This seems
ossible for education in particular.7 The constant is never neg-
tively significant. The within countries R2 is also of interest in
elling us how much variation within countries is explained by
he regressions. For total aid it is 0.46. It is substantially less
han this for education and other social infrastructure. It is much
igher for government, humanitarian and programme assistance.
5 In STATA the reported constant term is the average value of the fixed effects.
6 Significance for i when it equals 4, would carry the implication that aid is
till being disbursed from commitments made 4 years ago and hence can be
xpected to lead to continued disbursements in future periods.
7 Both Roodman (2006) and Celasun and Walliser (2008) assume that project
id is disbursed in equal amounts over a three-year period. These results cast
oubt on that assumption and hence on their analysis.
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Table 2
The impact of commitments on disbursements.
Total Education Health Other
social infra
Humanitarian Industry
Commitments
Current (t) 0.81**
(5.86)
0.20
(1.72)
0.36**
(3.28)
0.13**
(3.23)
0.48**
(2.97)
0.33**
(3.58)
t − 1 0.19
(1.41)
0.018
(0.23)
0.57**
(4.84)
0.093*
(2.54)
0.39**
(3.46)
0.091*
(2.55)
t − 2 −0.056
(0.83)
0.0853*
(2.01)
0.21**
(3.78)
0.11**
(3.25)
−0.054
(1.15)
0.23**
(2.68)
t − 3 0.25
(1.89)
0.027
(0.42)
−0.076
(0.65)
0.12*
(2.60)
−0.069*
(2.09)
0.034
(0.84)
t − 4 −0.086
(1.61)
0.032
(0.44)
0.074
(0.66)
0.060*
(2.61)
−0.0087
(0.18)
−0.0011
(0.04)
Constant −0.006
(0.44)
0.0057**
(5.63)
−0.0007
(0.65)
0.0043**
(5.52)
0.0012
(1.29)
0.00019
(1.09)
F 101.74** 18.52** 18.42** 9.85** 856.56** 5.83**
Overall R2 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.92 0.53
Within R2 0.46 0.14 0.70 0.28 0.81 0.40
Hausman test 3.45 277.93** 46.07** 127.24** 29.43** 38.32**
Commitments fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 1.00 0.22 0.93 0.22 0.87 0.43
4 years 1.19 0.33 1.07 0.45 0.75 0.67
5 years 1.10 0.37 1.14 0.51 0.74 0.69
From random effects equation, commitment fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.97 0.62 0.85 0.35 0.94 0.46
5 years 1.00 0.99 1.02 0.85 0.90 0.74
Disbursed share 0.472 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.50
Non-
industrial
P.
Infrastructure Debt Government PA Multi-
sector
Commitments
Current (t) 0.26**
(2.97)
0.11**
(3.70)
1.16**
(19.35)
0.77**
(8.63)
0.81**
(6.07)
0.67**
(4.32)
t − 1 0.44**
(13.04)
0.39**
(3.94)
0.025
(0.75)
0.037
(1.21)
0.035
(0.90)
0.15**
(3.13)
t − 2 0.033
(1.91)
0.11**
(4.36)
0.21*
(2.07)
0.011
(0.48)
0.052
(1.92)
0.020
(0.41)
t − 3 0.068
(1.52)
0.0082
(0.11)
−0.073
(1.44)
0.059
(1.83)
−0.050
(1.25)
0.018
(1.02)
t − 4 0.071
(1.22)
0.18**
(6.09)
0.056
(0.55)
−0.13**
(3.53)
0.0068
(0.23)
−0.032
(0.74)
Constant 0.00022
(0.40)
0.00094
(1.39)
0.0098**
(7.74)
0.0014
(1.17)
0.0008
(0.64)
0.00042
(0.35)
F 115.02** 85.40** 129.13** 646.92** 22.74** 297.38**
Overall R2 0.83 0.78 0.57 0.96 0.86 0.94
Within R2 0.77 0.55 0.52 0.86 0.76 0.66
Hausman test 41.29** 16.68** 3.26 23.43** 5.32 69.64**
Commitments fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.70 0.49 1.18 0.81 0.85 0.82
4 years 0.80 0.61 1.32 0.88 0.85 0.86
5 years 0.87 0.79 1.38 0.75 0.86 0.83
From random effects equation, commitment fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.71 0.53 1.18 0.86 0.89 0.99
5 years 0.96 0.90 1.52 0.85 0.90 0.97
Disbursed share 0.44 0.44 0.64 0.46 0.52 0.44
Notes: 809 observations covering the period (for disbursements) of 2002–2010, restricted to observations which met the coverage criteria described in the text.
Estimated using fixed effects with standard errors corrected to allow for clustered country correlation All variables, including lagged ones, are a proportion of GDP in
period t. **/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% level of significance. Disbursed share is the average of the ratio of disbursements to commitments plus disbursements.
A value of 0.50 indicates equality between commitments and disbursements on average, for other notes see Table 1.
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Table 3
Correlation matrix for regression errors.
Education Health Other social infra. Humanitarian Industry Non-industry Infrastructure Debt Government PA
Health 0.306*
Other social infra. 0.094* 0.039
Humanitarian 0.073 0.098* 0.055
Industry −0.086 −0.010 0.001 −0.010
Non-industrial P. 0.103* 0.129* 0.090 −0.010 −0.046
Infrastructure −0.019 −0.114* 0.048 0.054 −0.010 0.045
Debt −0.001 −0.156* 0.001 −0.004 −0.077 −0.038 0.007
Government −0.047 0.024 0.151* −0.133* 0.042 0.006 0.044 −0.016
PA −0.027 0.048 0.031 −0.147* 0.006 0.098* −0.077 0.050 0.056
Multi-sector −0.241* −0.090 0.117* −0.004 −0.019 −0.136* 0.005 0.054 −0.035 0.009
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ment that Bulir and Hamann’s (2003, 2008) most disturbing
finding was that commitments convey little more information
about future disbursements than do past disbursements.8 In gen-* Significance at the 1% level of significance, for other notes see Table 2.
 low within countries R2 could either reflect promises being
roken, or that the relationship between aid disbursements and
ommitments does not always closely follow the lag structure
e estimate as being representative. These equations were esti-
ated using fixed effects, primarily because the Hausman test
ndicated that this was generally preferable. In general the results
sing random effects showed more rapid and complete disburse-
ent figures as shown in the Table. This is particularly the case
or education. The random effects coefficients reflect an average
f between and within country effects, and fixed effects only the
atter.
The use of a restricted sample, based on those observations
here the coverage of disbursements and commitments meets
 minimum level raises a potential problem of sample selection
ias. We tested for this using Heckman’s methodology. We first
efined a variable equal to one if it met these criteria, and hence
as included in the regressions shown in Table 2, and zero
therwise. This formed the dependent variable in the selection
quation. The explanatory variables comprised the log of GDP
er capita, population density and year dummy variables. The
xplanatory power of the regression was quite high with a likeli-
ood ratio statistic of 446.8. Both the socio-economic variables
ere negatively significant, with GDP per capita significant at
he 1% level and population density at the 5% level. This indi-
ates that aid coverage data tended to decline with both GDP
er capita and population density, in other words coverage was
reater for poorer countries with low population densities. The
ear dummy variables were also jointly significant at the 1%
evel and indicated increasing coverage in more recent years.
he inverse Mills ratio calculated from this regression was never
ignificant in the second stage regressions at the 1% level and
nly significant at the 5% level in the education equation, with a
ositive coefficient, and the debt equation, with a negative coeffi-
ient. Its inclusion made very little difference to the coefficients
n lagged commitments, although the constant term did change.
ence sample selection bias does not appear to be exerting a
ajor influence on these results. In a further set of regressions,
e also added variables reflecting disbursement and commit-
ent coverage to the regressions, on the full sample of data,pecified in Table 2. Neither variable was significant in any
egression. Thus again the issue of coverage does not appear
o be exerting a major influence on the results, nor impacting ln any one sector disproportionately more than others. Finally,
hen we restricted the sample to 2006 and onwards, where cov-
rage is less of an issue, the results were largely similar. The
ain change was an increase in the 5 year implementation of
ducation commitments and a decline in the similar figure for
on-industrial production. When we regress the equation for
otal aid on a full sample, where sector coverage is not an issue,
he results were again not substantially different from those in
able 2, with the proportion of commitments met after two years
qual to 98% as opposed to 100% in the restricted sample shown
n Table 2.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix between the error terms
rom the regressions in Table 2. These correlations are significant
t the 1% level using the Breusch–Pagan test of independence.
ecause of this we estimated the equations jointly using the
uest command in STATA. These are the estimations shown in
he tables. Of the correlations in Table 3, eight were positive and
ix negative. The negative ones were restricted to the final four
ows involving humanitarian, government, PA and multi-sector
id. There is no evidence of debt aid ‘crowding out’ other aid
ithin countries in the same year, although it may have between
ountries or there may be a lagged impact. The evidence sug-
ests that humanitarian aid does crowd out government and PA
id, but is positively correlated with health aid. Finally health,
ducation and non-industrial production aid tend to be positively
orrelated.
Table 4 shows the results for Sub-Saharan Africa. They are
imilar to the main set of results, although if anything display
 slightly greater alignment of commitments with disburse-
ents. The two main exceptions to this appear be the health
nd multisector sectors, where fulfilled commitments are lower,
ut with significant constant terms, and education, government,
rogramme assistance and humanitarian aid, where fulfilled
ommitments are greater.
Is there any confirmation for Eifert and Gelb’s (2008) com-8 They employed a narrow definition of aid, comprising gross aid, i.e. ODA
oans and grants, excluding food and emergency aid and debt.
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Table 4
The impact of commitments on disbursements in Sub Saharan Africa.
Total Education Health Other
social infra
Humanitarian Industry
Commitments
Current (t) 0.92**
(7.37)
0.14
(1.89)
0.20**
(3.20)
0.17**
(7.36)
0.72**
(13.65)
0.28
(1.93)
t − 1 0.085
(0.65)
0.15*
(2.35)
0.17**
(5.18)
0.12**
(6.96)
0.26**
(3.91)
0.068
(1.95)
t − 2 0.019
(0.25)
0.20**
(3.19)
0.19**
(5.22)
0.18**
(5.42)
−0.10**
(2.97)
0.30**
(2.80)
t − 3 0.320
(1.84)
0.096
(1.79)
0.13
(1.88)
0.15**
(3.01)
−0.096
(1.73)
0.056
(0.83)
t − 4 −0.11
(1.00)
0.13*
(2.11)
0.14**
(2.80)
0.15**
(3.62)
0.16**
(4.06)
0.057
(1.09)
Constant −0.012
(0.98)
0.0036
(1.96)
0.0023*
(2.60)
0.0044**
(6.03)
0.00019
(0.23)
0.00008
(0.32)
F 168.93** 4.80** 37.27** 58.20** 1947.80* 44.09**
Overall R2 0.76 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.98 0.48
Within R2 0.48 0.27 0.50 0.47 0.94 0.36
Hausman test 5.02 29.6** 19.24** 30.82** 3.94 2.88
Commitments fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 1.00 0.29 0.38 0.29 0.98 0.35
4 years 1.34 0.59 0.70 0.62 0.78 0.71
5 years 1.22 0.72 0.84 0.77 0.95 0.77
From random effects equation, commitment fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.88 0.43 0.44 0.34 0.98 0.36
5 years 1.16 1.05 1.03 0.99 0.94 0.74
Non-
industrial
P.
Infrastructure Debt Government PA Multi-
sector
Commitments
Current (t) 0.15**
(3.35)
0.14**
(2.84)
1.18**
(17.70)
0.88**
(10.06)
0.84**
(5.94)
0.105*
(2.25)
t − 1 0.088**
(2.75)
0.13**
(6.50)
0.03
(0.82)
0.082**
(4.13)
0.037
(0.69)
0.12**
(6.57)
t − 2 0.10*
(2.25)
0.092
(1.87)
0.19
(1.95)
0.029
(1.06)
0.094
(1.67)
0.13**
(2.95)
t − 3 0.29*
(2.57)
0.20**
(6.98)
−0.062
(1.15)
0.091**
(4.52)
−0.091
(0.98)
0.080**
(2.95)
t − 4 0.210
(1.58)
0.17**
(2.83)
0.098
(0.78)
−0.19
(1.14)
0.038
(0.52)
0.089
(1.93)
Constant 0.0012
(1.52)
0.0023**
(3.14)
0.020**
(7.19)
−0.00094
(0.56)
0.00014
(0.15)
0.0026**
(4.76)
F 26.82** 42.01** 117.57** 92.42** 1000.83** 9.44**
Overall R2 0.68 0.68 0.55 0.94 0.87 0.72
Within R2 0.31 0.37 0.52 0.87 0.80 0.35
Hausman test 14.32** 23.88** 0.81 7.24** 0.17 32.85**
Commitments fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.23 0.27 1.21 0.96 0.88 0.23
4 years 0.63 0.57 1.34 1.08 0.88 0.44
5 years 0.84 0.74 1.44 0.89 0.92 0.53
From random effects equation, commitment fulﬁlled after (proportion)
2 years 0.33 0.35 1.17 0.89 0.88 0.30
5 years 1.05 0.85 1.37 0.79 0.92 0.70
N
e
c
a
a
a
b
t
c
hotes: 368 observations, for other notes see Table 2.
ral we find the answer to be no. If we regress total aid on
ommitments and lagged commitments and disbursements with
 lagged depth of two for the latter, then lagged disbursements
dd relatively little to the explanatory power of commitments,
s can be seen in Table 5. In addition with negative coefficients,
oth significant at the 1% level, they appear to be picking up
c
f
she short-run dynamics of aid disbursements. This is also the
ase with debt, government and PA aid and to a limited extent
umanitarian aid. Non-industrial production aid has a signifi-
antly positive coefficient on the first lagged disbursement term,
ollowed by a significantly negative one, of roughly similar
ize, on the second. Again this would appear to be adding to
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Table 5
The impact of commitments and lagged disbursements on disbursements.
Total Education Health Other social
infra.
Humanitarian Industry
Commitments
Current (t) 0.99**
(15.80)
0.43**
(17.18)
0.39**
(14.12)
0.1060**
(7.56)
0.47**
(27.96)
0.23**
(8.51)
t − 1 0.21**
(2.69)
0.12**
(2.89)
0.17**
(5.31)
0.058**
(3.42)
0.42**
(6.84)
0.18**
(5.40)
t − 2 0.24**
(2.85)
0.066
(1.74)
0.10**
(2.77)
0.057*
(2.14)
0.27**
(3.72)
0.37**
(13.24)
t − 3 0.27**
(3.14)
−0.11**
(3.80)
−0.12**
(3.31)
0.027
(0.94)
−0.14**
(2.69)
0.12**
(3.51)
t − 4 −0.12
(1.43)
−0.013
(0.42)
−0.0081
(0.23)
−0.032
(1.14)
−0.0012
(0.04)
0.025
(1.02)
Lagged disbursements
t − 1 −0.19**
(3.28)
0.051
(0.81)
0.037
(0.60)
0.18**
(3.63)
−0.25*
(2.42)
0.074
(1.46)
t − 2 −0.26**
(3.52)
−0.14*
(2.42)
−0.11
(1.90)
0.11*
(2.05)
−0.085
(0.82)
−0.18**
(4.31)
Constant −0.010
(0.84)
0.0050**
(9.24)
0.0035**
(7.37)
0.0051**
(9.89)
0.0015**
(3.36)
0.00004
(0.38)
F 49.24** 53.63** 39.71** 19.16** 206.71** 52.71**
Overall R2 0.79 0.83 0.79 0.87 0.87 0.61
Within R2 0.46 0.48 0.41 0.25 0.78 0.48
Non-industrial P. Infrastructure Debt Government PA Multi-sector
Commitments
Current (t) 0.25**
(9.62)
0.14**
(6.43)
1.31**
(17.42)
0.80**
(58.73)
0.89**
(48.90)
0.71**
(30.33)
t − 1 0.16**
(5.13)
0.24**
(11.09)
0.22*
(2.26)
0.12**
(2.99)
0.58**
(11.84)
0.10*
(2.49)
t − 2 0.20**
(5.98)
0.11**
(3.86)
0.56**
(4.64)
0.23**
(5.34)
0.48**
(10.35)
0.21**
(4.22)
t − 3 0.14**
(5.15)
0.046
(1.37)
−0.069
(0.53)
0.035*
(2.08)
0.0020
(0.10)
0.16**
(5.34)
t − 4 −0.11**
(4.00)
0.25**
(9.34)
0.069
(0.48)
−0.20**
(7.53)
−0.013
(0.74)
0.037
(1.37)
Lagged disbursements
t − 1 0.12*
(2.52)
−0.070
(1.24)
−0.17**
(3.02)
−0.18**
(3.83)
−0.60**
(12.09)
0.136*
(2.11)
t − 2 −0.11*
(2.07)
−0.056
(0.89)
−0.39**
(5.00)
−0.31**
(6.30)
−0.46**
(9.47)
−0.43**
(6.51)
Constant 0.0015**
(3.42)
0.0022*
(2.35)
0.019**
(4.71)
0.0042**
(7.03)
−0.00030
(0.65)
−0.00025
(0.46)
F 29.86** 43.71** 58.49** 571.9** 353.83** 178.54**
Overall R2 0.69 0.75 0.48 0.94 0.90 0.95
2 0 
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otes: 546 observations. For other notes see Table 2.
ur understanding of the short-run dynamics by which commit-
ents translate into disbursements, rather than supplementing
he information provided by commitments per se. Only for other
ocial infrastructure are the combined coefficients significantly
ositive. Bulir and Hamann also note that in 2000–2003, dis-
ursements fell short of commitments by about one-third. In
ur analysis we find that during the period 2002–2010 the aver-
ge ratio of disbursements to disbursements plus commitments9
as 47.2% for total aid, as can be seen from the final row in
9 Taking the average of the ratio of disbursements to commitments is not
ossible as for some observations commitments are zero.
r
d
l
a0.91 0.86 0.75
able 2. This is only slightly less than the value of 50% we
ould see if all commitments were met. It implies that the ratio
f disbursements to commitments equals 89.4%10 and indeed
his difference could be explained by some commitments being
isbursed after 2010, although to counter that some disburse-
ents may relate to commitments made prior to 2002. Theatios for health, other social infrastructure, non-industrial pro-
uction, infrastructure, government and multi sector are also
ess than 48%, particularly multi-sector aid, non-industrial pro-
10 This equals 0.472/(1-0.472) and a similar ratio can be calculated for the other
id sectors.
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pFig. 1. Commitme
uction and infrastructure, whilst those for industry, programme
ssistance and debt are above 50%, with debt being particularly
igh.11 The ratios of multi-sector and ‘non-industrial produc-
ion’ disbursements to commitments are just 78.3% and 77.6%
espectively, whilst other social infrastructure aid is 81.8%. In
ontrast to this, the ratio of debt disbursements to commitments
s 180%, i.e. disbursements are almost double commitments with
espect to debt. Of course the two sets of data are not entirely
ompatible. Disbursements, particularly for the early years will
elate to commitments made prior to 2002 and commitments in
he later years will be disbursed beyond 2010, although to an
xtent these two errors will cancel each other out. The longer
he time period, in our case nine years, the less a problem this
ecomes.
Thus overall the picture is not one of commitment promises
eing broken. However, for total aid there is some discrepancies
etween countries, which is even greater for some individual sec-
ors. There are 10 countries for which disbursements over the
ample period were less than 70% of commitments12 and where
his average shortfall was in excess of 0.5% of the country’s GDP.
hese were, with the average shortfall as a percentage of GDP
hown in parentheses: Bangladesh (1.13%), Belize (0.93%),
enya (2.37%), Mauritius (0.91%), Mongolia (2.44%), Pakistan
1.12%), St. Kitts & Nevis (0.80%), Uzbekistan (0.66%), Viet-
am (1.85%) and Yemen (0.93%). In the case of several of these.
11 Thus although there is no evidence for debt aid crowding out other aid in
able 3,these results do point to the possibility of such crowding out.
12 These were all countries which had a minimum of five years of data which
et the coverage criteria for Table 1.
o
i
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td disbursements.
his may reflect aid on a rising trend with disbursements catch-
ng up commitments. Although as can be seen from Fig. 1, this
s not obviously the case for all the countries. In particular sev-
ral countries saw a surge in commitments in the early years of
he sample period which to a large extent subsequently failed
o materialise. At the other extreme there were five countries,
ainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose disbursements were more
han 25% greater than commitments and the gap was in excess of
.5% of the country’s GDP. These were, with the average surplus
s a proportion of GDP shown in parentheses, Gambia (6.44%),
uinea-Bissau (2.94%), Madagascar (4.90%), Malawi (9.99%)
nd Mauritania (4.56%). All of these were largely caused by
pikes in debt aid which were not well signalled by commit-
ents. This tentatively suggests that some countries at least,
ee a pattern by which they are, over a sustained period, being
romised aid and the promises are not fully being met.
Of course, a shortfall in disbursements can result from the
ehaviour of the recipient. Field experience suggests that it is not
erribly uncommon for a recipient not to draw on funds provided
o it by a donor, or engage in behaviour that makes it adminis-
ratively impossible for a donor to release funds for an agreed
urpose. Depending upon the nature of the behaviour this might
r might not be construed as representing a broken promise. But
f we go back to the results by Eifert and Gelb (2008) only 40%
f non-disbursements were considered to be due to a failure to
eet policy conditionality, with 33% ascribed to problems on
he donor’s side and a further 25% to recipient governments’
elays in meeting administrative conditions. However, the latter
hould delay aid, rather than cancel it. This therefore warrants
urther analysis on several dimensions, perhaps in identifying
he donors who most frequently fail to meet their commitments,
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s well as with detailed case studies. In addition further analysis
ould examine a possible link between commitments and lagged
isbursements. For example, suppose that the recipient economy
s suddenly hit by a large negative shock (e.g. a drought). This
an cause an aid surge in excess of commitments for some sec-
ors and could also lead to an increase, or indeed a decrease,
n commitments in the future, and possibly even in the present,
hus further complicating the relationship between the two.
.  Conclusions
We have used a new database, or rather an updated and
ore reliable version of an older database, to examine aid
redictability, i.e. the relationship between commitments and
isbursements. Overall, the regression results suggest that on
verage almost all commitments tend to be met within two
ears, with most being met immediately.13 Thus, contrary to
he existing literature on predictability, we do not find there to
e relatively little relationship between commitments and dis-
ursements, at least at the aggregate level. But the situation
s somewhat different with respect to individual sectors. Debt
id commitments are fulfilled, even over-fulfilled, very quickly.
ther sectors, such as infrastructure and other social infrastruc-
ure, have very long lags. For both of these, commitments are still
aving a significant impact on disbursements some five years
fter they were made. For other aid sectors it seems unlikely that
he commitments will ever be fully reflected in disbursements.
his is particularly the case for humanitarian and industry aid.
ut even in these sectors it is not true to conclude that there is
ittle relationship between commitments and disbursements.
How to reconcile, the fairly rapid and almost total realisation
f overall aid commitments, with the more patchy situation with
espect to individual sectors? In part the answer lies with the
act that some of these sectors are relatively small and hence
hey will have little impact on the overall picture. However
n addition to this, and apart from potential problems in cat-
gorising aid into sectors, there is the possibility that aid is
eing switched between sectors in response to short term fac-
ors. Another is that many commitments are simply not fulfilled
ith new priorities overtaking older ones. Finally, for education,
ther social infrastructure and also debt aid, there appears to be a
onstant flow of disbursements for countries regardless of com-
itments. Nonetheless, overall for most of these cases the sum
f commitments is reasonably close to the sum of promises. But
ulti-sector aid and aid for non-industrial production are to an
xtent exceptions, with relatively low fulfilment. This then is
he overall picture, one where by and large promises are in the
ggregate largely fulfilled. But we have also noted that there is
ome evidence that a not insignificant number of countries are
eing promised aid which fails to materialise. Depending on the
nderlying reasons this may be a matter for concern.
13 Bearing in mind of course that these regression results are only an estimate
f what actually happens.
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ppendix.  Data  deﬁnitions
Sector aid (Source  the  CRS  data  base:
ttp://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1).
ducation Primary, secondary and post-secondary
education
ealth General and basic health
ther social Infrastructure Population, water supply and sanitation and
‘other social infrastructure and services’, i.e.
all social infrastructure aid other than for
health, education and government.
overnment (and civil society) Includes general activities (e.g.
anti-corruption, judiciary) as well as conflict
and security areas; note in the CRS this is
part of social infrastructure.
rogramme assistance (PA) Un-earmarked contributions to the
government budget; support for the
implementation of macroeconomic reforms
(structural adjustment programmes, poverty
reduction strategies); general programme
assistance (when not allocable by sector).
Also includes Developmental food aid/food
security assistance
ndustry Industry, mining and construction
on-industrial Production Agriculture forestry and fishing, tourism and
trade policy and regulations, i.e. all of the
production sector other than in industry aid
as defined above.
nfrastructure Economic infrastructure and services
includes transport, communications, energy,
banking and financial services and business
services
umanitarian Comprises emergency response,
reconstruction relief and rehabilitation and
disaster prevention.
ulti-sector Multi-sector and cross cutting, includes
general environmental protection
ebt Includes debt forgiveness, rescheduling, buy
backs, etc.
otes: The data is all derived from the section called ‘sector’ on the database,
hich is why we use the term. The CRS comments that not all aid is allocable
o sectors and can be included as non-sector allocable aid.
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